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Abst rac t  
Suppose that Alice, owner of a k-anonymous database, needs to determine whether her 
database, when inserted with a tuple owned by Bob, is still k-anonymous. Suppose moreover that 
access to  the database is strictly controlled, because for example data are used for experiments 
that need to be maintained confidential. Clearly, allowing Alice to directly read the contents 
of the tuple breaks the privacy of Bob; on the other hand, the confidentiality of the database 
managed by Alice is violated once Bob has access to the contents of the database. Thus the 
problem is to  check whether the database inserted with the tuple is still k-anonymous, without 
letting Alice and Bob know the contents of the tuple and the database respectively. In this 
paper, we propose two protocols solving this problem on suppression-based and generalization- 
based k-anonymous databases. The protocols rely on well-known cryptographic assumptions, 
and we provide experimental results illustrating their efficiency. 
1 Introduction 
It  is today well understood that databases represent an important asset for many applications and 
thus their security is crucial. Data confidentiality is particularly relevant because of the value, often 
not only monetary, that data have. For example, medical data collected by following the history of 
patients over several years may represent an invaluable asset that needs to be adequately protected. 
Such a requirement has motivated a large variety of approaches aiming at better protecting data 
confidentiality and data ownership. Relevant approaches include query processing techniques for 
encrypted data and data watermarking techniques. Data confidentiality is not however the only 
requirement that needs to be addressed. 
Today there is an increased concern for privacy. The availability of huge numbers of databases 
recording a large variety of information about individuals makes it possible to discover information 
about specific individuals by simply correlating all the available databases. Although confidentiality 
and privacy are often used as synonyms, they are different concepts: data confidentiality is about 
the difficulty (or impossibility) by an unauthorized user to learn anything about data stored in 
the database. Usually, confidentiality is achieved by enforcing an access policy, and possibly by 
using cryptographic tools. Privacy relates to what data can be safely disclosed without leaking 
sensitive information regarding the legitimate owner [5]. Thus, zf one asks whether conjidentialzty 
i s  still required once data have been anonymized, the reply is yes zf the anonymous data have a 
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business value for the party owning t h e m  or the unauthorized disclosure of such anonymous data 
m a y  damage the party owning the data or  other parties. 
To better understand the difference, consider the case of a medical facility connected with 
a research institution. Suppose that all patients treated at the facility are asked before leaving 
the facility to "donate" their personal health care records, reporting their medical history, to the 
research institution, which collects the records in a research database. To guarantee the maximum 
privacy to each patient, the medical facility only sends to the research database an anonymized 
version of the patient record. Once this anonymized record is stored in the research database, the 
non-anon~mized version of the record is removed from the system of the medical facility. Thus 
the research database used by the researchers is anonymous. Suppose that certain data concerning 
patients are related to  the use of a drug over a period of four years and suppose that certain side- 
effects have been observed and recorded by the researchers in the research database. It is clear 
that these data (even if anonymized) need to be kept confidential and accessible only to  the few 
researchers of the institution working on this project, until further evidence is found about the 
drug. If these anonymous data were to be disclosed, privacy of the patients would not be at  risk; 
however the company manufacturing the drug may be aversely affected. 
Recently, techniques addressing the problem of privacy through data anonymization have been 
developed, thus making it more difficult to  link sensitive information to specific individuals. One 
well-known technique is k-anonymization initially proposed by Sweeney [27]. Such technique pro- 
tects privacy by modifying the data so that the probability of linking a given data value, for example 
a given disease, to a specific individual is very small. So far, the problems of data confidentiality 
and anonymization have been considered separately. However, a relevant problem arises when data 
stored in a confidential, anonymity-preserving database need to be updated. The operation of up- 
dating such a database, e.g. by inserting a tuple containing information about a given individual, 
introduces two problems concerning both the anonymity and confidentiality of the data stored in 
the database and the privacy of the individual to whom the data to be inserted are related: (i)  I s  
the updated database still privacy-preserving? and (i i)  Does the database owner need to  know the 
data t o  be inserted? Clearly, the two problems are related in the sense that they can be combined 
into the following problem: can the database owner decide if the updated database still preserves 
privacy of individuals without directly knowing the new data to be inserted? The answer we give 
in this work is affirmative. 
It is important to note that assuring that a database maintains the privacy of individuals to 
whom data are referred is often of interest not only to these individuals, but also to the organization 
owning the database. Because of current regulations, like HIPAA [16], organizations collecting data 
about individuals are under the obligation of assuring individual privacy. It is thus in their interest 
to  check that data that are entered in their databases do not violate privacy, and they must be 
able to perform such a verification without seeing any sensitive data of an individual. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
We assume that the information concerning a single patient is stored in a single tuple. As we 
already said, since DB contains privacy-sensitive data, one main concern is to protect the privacy 
of patients. Such task is guaranteed through the use of anonymization. Intuitively, if the database 
DB is anonymous, it is not possible to infer the patients' identities from the information contained 
in DB. This is achieved by blending information about patients. See Section 3 for a precise 
definition. Suppose now that a new patient has to be treated. Obviously, this means that the 































Anonymous ----------. ......... 
: authentication 
: - - - - - -A"o~Y~ou!.  
connection 
\-' users 
Figure 1: Anonymous Database System 
The modification of the anonymous database D B  can be naively performed as follows: the party 
managing the database simply checks whether the updated database D B  U { t )  is still anonymous. 
Under this approach, the entire tuple t has to be revealed to the party managing the database, 
thus violating the privacy of the patient. Another possibility would be to make available the 
entire database to the patient so that the patient can verify by himselflherself if the insertion of 
his/her data violates his/her own privacy. This approach however requires making available the 
entire database to the patient and thus violating data confidentiality. In order to devise a suitable 
solution, several problems need to be addressed: Problem 1: how to establish the anonymity of 
D B  U { t )  without revealing the contents of t and D B ?  Problem 2: once such anonymity is 
established, how to perform this update? Problem 3: what can be done zf database anonymity is  
not preserved? Finally, problem 4 what is  the initial content of the database, when no  data about 
users has been inserted yet? In this paper, we propose two protocols solving Problem 1, which is 
the central problem addressed by our paper. 
Note that to assure a higher level of anonymity to the party inserting the data, we require that 
the communication between this party and the database occurs through an anonymous connection, 
as provided by protocols like Crowds [22] or Onion routing [21]. This is necessary since traffic 
analysis can potentially reveal sensitive information based on users' IP addresses. In addition, 
sensitive information about the party inserting the data may be leaked from the access control 
policies adopted by the anonymous database system, in that an important requirement is that only 
authorized parties, for example patients, should be able to enter data in the database. Therefore, 
the question is how to enforce authorization without requiring the parties inserting the data to 
disclose their identities. An approach that can be used is based on techniques for user anonymous 
authentication and credential verification [17]. The above discussion illustrates that the problem 
of anonymous updates to confidential databases is complex and requires the combination of several 
techniques, some of which are proposed for the first time in this paper. Figure 1 summarizes the 
various phases of an comprehensive approach to the problem of anonymous updates to confidential 
databases, while Table 1 summarizes the required techniques and identifies the role of our techniques 
in such approach. 
1.2 Proposed Solutions 
All protocols we propose to solve Problem 1 rely on the fact that the anonymity of D B  is not 
affected by inserting t if the information contained in t ,  properly anonymized, is already contained 
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is aimed at suppression-based anonymous databases, and it allows the owner of D B  to properly 
anonymize the tuple t ,  without gaining any useful knowledge on its contents and without having to 
send to t's owner newly generated data. To achieve such goal, the parties secure their messages by 
encrypting them. In order to perform the privacy-preserving verification of the database anonymity 
upon the insertion, the parties use a commutative and homomorphic encryption scheme. The second 
protocol (see Section 5) is aimed at generalization-based anonymous databases, and it relies on a 
secure set intersection protocol, such as the one found in [3], to support privacy-preserving updates 
on a generalization-based k-anonymous DB. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work on anonymity and privacy 
in data management. Section 3 introduces notions about anonymity and privacy that we need in 
order to define our protocols and prove their correctness and security. The protocols are defined 
respectively in Section 4 and Section 5 with proofs of correctness and security. Section 6 analyzes 
the complexity of the proposed protocol and presents experimental complexity results we obtained 
by running such protocols on real-life data. Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines future work. 
2 Related Work 
A preliminary approach to this problem was investigated in [24]. However these protocols have 
some serious limitations, in that they do not support generalization-based updates, which is the 
main strategy adopted for data anonymization. Therefore, if the database is not anonymous with 
respect to a tuple to be inserted, the insertion cannot be performed. In addition one of the protocols 
is extremely inefficient. In the current paper, we present two efficient protocols, one of which also 
support the private update of a generalization-based anonymous database. We also provide security 
proofs and experimental results for both protocols. So far no experimental results had been reported 
concerning such type of protocols; our results show that both protocols perform very efficiently. In 
what follows, we briefly address other research directions relevant for our work. 
The first research direction deals with algorithms for database anonymization. The idea of pro- 
tecting databases through data suppression or data perturbation has been extensively investigated 
in the area of statistical databases [I]. Recently, relevant work has been carried out by Sweeney 
[27], who initially proposed the notion of k-anonymity for databases in the context of medical data, 
and by Aggarwal et al. [2], who have developed complexity results concerning algorithms for k- 
anonymization. The problem of computing a k-anonymization of a set of tuples while maintaining 
the confidentiality of their content is addressed by Zhong et al. [28]. However, these proposals do 
not deal with the problem of private updates to k-anonymous databases. 
The second research direction is related to Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) techniques. 
SMC represents an important class of techniques widely investigated in the area of cryptography. 
General techniques for performing secure computations are today available [14]. However, these 
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techniques generally are not efficient. Such shortcomings has motivated further research in order to 
devise more efficient protocols for particular problems. Of particular relevance for data management 
are the techniques presented in [3, 121, in which the authors address the problems of efficiently and 
privately computing set intersection and (in case of [3]) database oriented operations, such as joins. 
The third research direction is related to the area of private information retrieval, which can 
be seen as an application of the secure multi-party computation techniques to the area of data 
management. Here, the focus is to devise efficient techniques for posing expressive queries over 
a database without letting the database know the actual queries [9, 181. Again, the problem of 
privately updating a database has not been addressed in that these techniques only deal with data 
retrieval. 
Finally, the fourth research direction is related to query processing techniques for encrypted 
data [7, 15, 251. These approaches, however, do not address the k-anonymity problem since their 
goal is to encrypt data, so that their management can be outsourced to external entities. Thus, 
the goal is to  protect data confidentiality from the external entities managing the data; however, 
data are fully available to the clients, which is not the case under our approach. 
3 Basic Definitions and Assumptions 
3.1 Anonymity Definitions 
We consider a table T = {tl, . . . , t,) over the attribute set A. The idea is to form subsets of indis- 
tinguishable tuples by masking the values of some well-chosen attributes. In particular, when using 
a suppression-based anonymization method, we mask with the special value *, the value deployed 
by Alice for the anonymization. When using a generalization-based anonymization method, origi- 
nal values are replaced by more general ones, according to apriori established value generalization 
hierarchies (VGHs) [27]. We adopt the following notations thereafter: 
Quasi-Identifier (QI): a set of attributes that can be used with certain external information 
to identify a specific individual. 
T[QI]: T[QI] is the projection of T to the set of attributes contained in QI.  
Definition 3.1 T[QI] satisfies k-anonymity if and only if each record in it appears at least k times. 
Suppose Q I  = {AREA, POSITION, SALARY), Table 3 shows a suppression based k-anonymization 
with k = 2. Choosing the suppressed attributes for every tuple of T is referred as the anonymiza- 
tion problem, and finding the anonymization that minimizes the number of masked values is an 
NP-hard problem [2]. 
For generalization-based anonymization, we assume that each attribute value can be mapped 
to  a more general value. The main step in most generalization based k-anonymity protocols is 
t o  replace a specific value with a more general value. For instance, Figure 2 contains VGHs for 
attributes AREA, POSITION and SALARY. According to the VGH of AREA, we say that the 
value "Data Mining" can be generalized to "Database Systems". (Suppression can be viewed as an 
extreme form of generalization, in which the generalized attributes cannot be further generalized.) 
Let T refer to Table 4 and Q I  = {AREA, POSITION, SALARY). Then T (T[QI]) satisfies 2- 
anonymity. According to the three VGHs, it is easy to verify that the original data represented by 
Table 2 can be generalized to T .  When T is k-anonymous, we can delete duplicate tuples, and we 



























Table 2: Original Dataset 
AREA POSITION SALARY 
Data Mining Associate Professor $90,000 
Intrusion Detection Assistant Professor $78,000 
Handheld Systems Research Assistant $17,000 
Handheld Systems Research Assistant $15,500 
Query Processing Associate Professor $100,000 
Digital Forensics Assistant Professor $78,000 
Table 3: Suppressed Data with k = 2 
AREA POSITION SALARY 
* Associate Professor * 
* Assistant Professor * 
Handheld Systems Research Assistant * 
Handheld Systems Research Assistant * 
* Associate Professor * 
* Assistant Professor * 
Table 4: Generalized Data with k = 2 
AREA POSITION SALARY 
Database Systems Associate Professor [61k, 120kl 
Information Security Assistant Professor [61k, 120kl 
Operating Systems Research Assistant [ I lk ,  30k] 
Operation Systems Research Assistant [ I lk ,  30k] 
Database Systems Associate Professor [61k, 120kl 
Information Security Assistant Professor [61k, 120kl 
Table 5: The witness Set 
AREA POSITION SALARY 
Database Systems Associate Professor [61k, 120kl 
Information Security Assistant Professor [61k, 120kl 
Operating Systems Research Assistant [Ilk,  30k] 
3.2 Cryptographic Primitives 
The protocol in Section 4 uses a commutative, product-homomorphic encryption scheme E. Loosely 
speaking, a commutative, product-homomorphic encryption scheme ensures that one party cannot 
perform encryption alone (commutativity) and it allows to consistently perform arithmetic oper- 
ations over encrypted data (homomorphic property). Further, for the security proofs we require 
that the encryption scheme E satisfies the indistinguishability property. We extend the definition 
of commutative, indistinguishable encryption scheme presented in [3], in order to obtain an encryp- 
tion scheme which also product-homomorphic. Given a finite set K: of keys and a finite domain 
23, a commutative, product-homomorphic encryption scheme E is a polynomial time computable 
function E : K: x 23 -+ 23 satisfying the following properties: 
1. Commutativity. For all key pairs K1, K2 E K: and value d E 23, the following equality holds: 
EKI (EKZ ( d ) )  = E K ~  (EK~ (d)) (1) 
,
* ssociate Professor *
* ssistant Professor *
*
*
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C~mputer  Science 
Database Systems information Securily Operating Systems 
4 4 4 
Data Mining Data Warehousing lnuusion Detection Distributed Systems 
Query Processing 
Digital Forensics Handheld Systems 
(a) VGH of AREA 
Faculty 
Professors Assistants 
Assistant Professor Teaching Assistant 
Associate Professor Research Assistant 
(b) VGH of POSITION 
/ t  / \ ~  \ 
[Ilk, 30kl [31k, 60k] [61k, 90k] [91k, 120kl [121k, 150k] 
(c) VGH of SALARY 
Figure 2: Value Generalization Hierarchies 
2. Product-homomorphism. For every K E K and every value pairs d l ,  d2 E D, the following 
equality holds: 
EK ( d l )  . EK (d2) = EK (dl - d2) (2)  
3. Indistinguishability [13]. It is infeasible to distinguish an encryption from a random chosen 
value in the same domain and having the same length. In other words, it is infeasible for 
an adversary, with finite computational capability, to extract information about a plaintext 
from the ciphertext. 
We will use the indistinguishability property when proving in Section 4.1 the security of Protocols 
4.1 and 5.1. As an example of commutative, product-homomorphic, indistinguishable encryption 
scheme, we consider the following setting. Let D be a subgroup of prime order q of Z,, with p 
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Assuming the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption [6 ] ,  the function 
def K 
EK(d) = d modp (3) 
is a commutative, product-homomorphic, indistinguishable encryption scheme [3]. 
Finally, following [8, 201, we introduce a simple tuple coding scheme that we will use in Protocol 
5.1: Alice and Bob agree on a set {gl, g2. . . , g,) of generators of V. Let d be a tuple (dl, d2,. . . , d,) 
with elements taken from Zg, we define the encoding of a tuple d as 
Such coding scheme is known in literature as DLREP (Discrete Logarithm Representation). 
Note that such coding acts like a collision-free hash function, as explained in [19, Section 4.31. 
4 A Private Update Protocol for Suppression-based Anonymous Databases 
In this section, we assume that the database is anonymized using a suppression-based method. 
Note that our protocols are not required to further improve the privacy of users other than that 
provided by the fact that the updated database is still k-anonymous. Suppose that Alice owns a 
k-anonymous table T over the QI attributes. Alice has to decide whether T when inserted with a 
tuple t ,  owned by Bob, is still k-anonymous, without directly knowing the values in t (assuming t 
and T have the same schema). This problem amounts to decide whether t matches any tuple in 
T on the non-suppressed Q I  attributes. If this is the case, then t ,  properly anonymized, can be 
inserted into T. Otherwise, the insertion of t into T is rejected. 
A trivial solution requires as a first step Alice to send Bob the suppressed attributes names, 
for every tuple in the witness set (61,. . . ,6,) of T. In this way, Bob knows what values are to 
be suppressed from his tuple. After Bob computes the anonymized or suppressed versions of 
tuple t ,  1 5 i 5 w, he and Alice can start a protocol (e.g., the Intersection Size Protocol in [3]) 
for privately testing the equality of 6 and Ji. As a drawback, Bob gains knowledge about the 
suppressed attributes of Alice. 
A solution that addresses such drawback is based on the following protocol. Assume Alice 
and Bob agree on a commutative and product-homomorphic encryption scheme E and Q I  = 
{A1,. . . , A,). Further, they agree on a coding c(-) (Equation 4) as well. Since other non-QI 
attributes do not play any role in our computation, without loss of generality, let Ji = (v:, . . . , v:) 
be the tuple containing only the s non-suppressed Q I  attributes of witness wi, and t = (vl, . . . , v,). 
Protocol 4.1 allows Alice to compute an anonymized version of t without letting her know the 
contents of t  and, at the the same time, without letting Bob know what are the suppressed attributes 
of the tuples in T. 
The protocol works as follows: at Step 1, Alice sends Bob an encrypted version of Ji, containing 
only the s non-suppressed QI attributes. At Step 2, Bob encrypts the information received from 
Alice and sends it to her, along with encrypted version of each value in his tuple t. At Steps 3-4, 
Alice examines if the non-suppressed QI attributes of hi is equal to those of t. 
Protocol 4.1 
1. Alice codes her tuple Ji into c((vi,. . . , v;)), denoted as ~ ( 6 ~ ) .  Then, she encrypts c(Ji) with 
her private key and sends EA(c(Ji)) to Bob. 
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2. Bob individually codes each attribute value in t to get the tuple of coded values (c(vl), . . . , c(v,)), 
encrypts each coding and EA(c(bi)) with his key B and sends (i) (EB(c(vl)), . . . , EB(c(vu))), 
and (ii) EB (EA(c(bi))) to Alice. 
3. Since E is a commutative encryption scheme, EB(EA(c(bi))) = EA(EB(c(bi))), Alice decrypts 
EA(EB ( ~ ( b i ) ) )  to EB(c(6i)). 
4. Since the encrypted values sent by Bob are ordered in a tuple according to the schema of T ,  
Alice knows which are, among the encrypted values sent by Bob, the one corresponding to 
the suppressed and non-suppressed QI attributes. Thus Alice computes 
where vl, . . . , v, are the values of non-suppressed attributes contained in tuple t. As already 
mentioned, E is a product-homomorphic encryption scheme. Based also on the definition of 
function c(.), this implies that Expression 5 is equal to 
5 .  Alice checks whether EB(c((v1, . . . , v,))) = EB(c((vi, . . . , vi))). If true, t (properly anonymized) 
can be inserted to table T .  Otherwise, when inserted to T ,  t breaks k-anonymity. 
4.1 Proof of Correctness 
Basically, Protocol 4.1 determines if given an anonymous tuple in Alice's database, its unsuppressed 
attribute values match those of Bob's tuple. Following the same notations used previously, the next 
two propositions guarantee the correctness of Protocol 4.1. 
Proposition 4.1 Given Bob's tuple t and Alice's tuple bi, if every non-suppressed attribute value in 
6i is equal to the corresponding attribute value in t, the condition EB(c(vl,.. . , v,)) = E ~ ( c ( v i , . .   ,vi)) 
always holds. 
Proof. The proof is trivial. Since vl = vi, . . . , v, = vi, c((vl, .. . , v,)) = c((vi,. . . vi)). Thus, the 
condition EB (c((vl, . . . , v,))) = EB(c((v;, . . . , vi))) holds. 
Proposition 4.2 Given Bob's tuple t and Alice's tuple bi, if there exists any non-suppressed 
attribute value in bi is not equal to the corresponding attribute value in t, then the condition 
EB(c((ul,. . . ,us))) = EB(c((u;, . . . , ui))) does hold with negligible probability (almost 0) provided 
that c is collision-free. 
+ + 
Proof. Let a' = (ui, . . . , ui) and b = (ul,. . . , us). The expression a' # b means there exists at least 
one pair (ui, ui) (1 5 i 5 s) such that ui # ui. Suppose the claim not to be true, then 
where p(.) is some positive polynomial. The above equation is equivalent to 
(vI), . u )),
(C(Oi) ) (C(VI) , . (c(vu ) ,
i) (EA(C(Oi) ) .
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However, because the encoding c is collision-free [19, Section 4.31, we have: 
This contradicts Equation 8, and thus contradicts the initial assumptions, and the proposition 
follows. 
4.2 Proof of Security 
We rely on the notion of security of a two-party protocol with semi-honest parties as presented in 
[14]. We underline that the adopted proof methodology is a standard cryptographic tool. What 
follows is an informal, concise presentation of what is needed in the proof of Proposition 4.3. For 
the formal definitions we refer to [14, Section 7.2.21. By view of party P (where P is chosen among 
Alice and Bob) of Protocol 4.1, we mean the sequence vp = (inP, m r ,  m f ,  . . . , mz) ,  where inP is 
the input provided by party P to Protocol 4.1 and m r ,  mf,.  . ., m c  are the messages that party P 
receives during the execution of Protocol 5.1. Note that the output of Protocol 4.1 is implicit in the 
sequence of messages received by party P. Protocol 4.1 is secure (in the semi-honest model) iff the 
views V ~ l i ~ ~  and vgob are efficiently simulated only knowing, respectively, the inputs inAliCe, inBob 
and the output of Protocol 4.1. This holds provided that both Alice and Bob are semi-honest: they 
follow Protocol 4.1 properly, except that they keep track of all their intermediate computations. 
Proposition 4.3 Protocol 4.1 is secure. 
Proof. The parties of Protocol 4.1, Alice and Bob, are alternatively replaced by their corresponding 
simulators sAlice and sBob. By hypothesis, the simulator SP, where P E {Alice, Bob), knows the 
input inP and the output of Protocol 4.1. Further, it does not know the messages both parties 
exchange during the execution of Protocol 4.1. The simulator SF acts as her/his corresponding 
party P,  but instead of sending to the other party the messages requested by Protocol 4.1, SP 
sends a random message. We now show in details how the simulators sAIiCe and sBob behave and 
show that they cannot be (easily) distinguished from their respective parties. 
Simulating Alice: The simulator SAIiCe follows Protocol 4.1 as Alice does, except in Step 
1. Instead of sending the value EA(c(Gi)), SAliCe s nds a random message r, where r is uniformly 
drawn from D. There is no polynomial time algorithm that tells apart EA(c(Gi)) from r, since E is 
an indistinguishable encryption scheme (Property 3 of Section 3.2). This means that the simulator 
SALiCe cannot be distinguished from Alice in polynomial time. 
Simulating Bob: The simulator sBob is more complex to define. The simulator SBob ehaves 
as Bob, following Protocol 4.1, except in Step 2. Concerning message (a), the simulator SBob -
instead of sending EB(EA(c(Gi))) and to Alice - produces a random values r uniformly drawn from 
the domain D, and sends it to Alice. Like for the Alice's simulation, there is no polynomial time 
algorithm able of telling apart EB(EA(c(Gi))) from r. This amount to say, regarding message (a) in 
Step 2 of Protocol 4.1, that Alice and her simulator SAliCe are not polynomial-time distinguishable. 
Proving that message (b) can be simulated requires the following: 
Fact Let vl, v2,. . . , v,,rl,r2,. . . ,r, and K be uniformly chosen respectively from D and K:. 
Let t = (vl, v2, . . . , a,), r = (TI, 7-2, . . . , r,) and EK (t) = (EK (vl), EK(v~) ,  . . . , EK (v,)). Then, 
(t, EK(t))  is indistinguishable from (t, r ) .  This fact follows from the generalized DiffieHellman 
assumption [26]. The assumption states that the tuple (gK1, gK2, . . . , g K,, g ~ l .  ... .K,) is indistin- 
guishable from the tuple (gK1,gK2,. . . , gKu, r ) ,  where g is a generator of D, K1,.  . . K,, K ,  r are 
uniformly drawn respectively from K: and D. 
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We prove the case in which u = 2. By DDH, the triple (gK1, gK2, gK1'K2) is indistinguish- 
able from the triple (gK1,gK2,r) (we recall that g is a generator of D, K1, K2, r are uniformly 
chosen from K and D, and the exponentiation is made modulo a prime p). Let K be another 
key uniformly chosen from K. Then we have that (gK1, gK2, gK1'K2'K) is indistinguishable from 
(gK1, gK2, r' = rK) . Let consider the quadruple (gK1, gK2, gK1'K2'K, gK1'K2'K), indistinguishable 
from (gK1, gK2, r' , r') , from which, we derive a new quadruple (gK1, gK2, gK1'K2, gK2'K), by deleting 
K2 and K1 in the exponents of the 3rd and 4th items. Such quadruple is indistinguishable from 
the quadruple (gK1, gK2, rl = r'/rK2, 7-2 = r'/rK1). Rewriting gK1 and gK2 respectively as vl and 
212, we get that (vl, v2, EK (vl), EK (212)) is indistinguishable from (vl, v2, rl , r2).  
The simulator sBob sends a sequence (rl, 7-2, . . . , r,) of uniformly chosen values from D to Alice, 
instead of the sequence (EB (vl), EB (v2), . . . , EB (v,)) . Having previously proved that sequences of 
encrypted values from D are indistinguishable from sequences of randomly chosen values from the 
same domain, we have that one cannot tell apart Bob from its simulator SBob in polynomial time. 
5 A Private Update Protocol for Generalization-based Anonymous Databases 
In this section, we assume that the table T is anonymized using a generalization-based method; 
let rl, . . . , I?, be u disjoint value generalization hierarchies (VGHs) corresponding to A1,. . . , A, E 
Atnon known to Alice. Let S E T, and let GetSpec(SIAl, . . . ,A,], rl, . . . , I',) (GetSpec(6) for short) 
denote a function which returns a set y of specific values (values at the bottom of a VGH) related 
to each attribute Ai E Atnon such that every value in y can be generalized to S[Ai] for some i 
according to ri. For example, let T refer to Table 4 and Atnon = {AREA, POSITION, SALARY). 
If S = [Operating Systems, Research Assistant, [llk,30k]], then based on the VGHs (presented in 
Figure 2) GetSpec(6) = {Distributed Systems, Handheld Systems, Research Assistant, $15,000, 
$17,000, $15,500). Let t be Bob's private tuple, and assume that Bob knows the set AFnon. Bob 
can generate a set T containing the corresponding values t[A1], . . . , t[A,]; the size of T is always u. 
We denote by SSI(y ,  T) as a secure protocol that computes the cardinality of y n ~ .  Such protocols 
can be found in [3, 121. Upon receiving an initial request from Bob, Alice starts the protocol by 
randomly choosing a tuple S from the witness set Tw of T. After Alice computes y = GetSpec(S), 
she and Bob privately compute SSI(y,  7). Note that Bob does not need to know any I'i. We 
claim that if SSI(y ,  T) = u (the size of A:non), t[A1,. . . ,A,] can be generalized to S, and hence 
this insertion into T can be safely performed without breaking the k-anonymity property. We will 
prove this claim later in the section. The protocol's details follow: 
Protocol 5.1 
1. Alice randomly chooses a S E Tw 
2. Alice computes y = GetSpec(S) 
3. Alice and Bob collaboratively compute s = SSI(~,T) 
4. If s = u then t's generalized form can be safely inserted to T 
5. 0 therwise, Alice computes Tw t Tw - (6) and repeat the above procedures until either s = u 
or Tw = 0 
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The following example illustrates the execution of the protocol. Suppose Alice has the witness 
set Tw (Table 5) of T (Table 4), and u = 3 in this example. If Bob's tuple t = [Data Mining, Teaching 
Assistant, $15,0001, then T = {Data Mining, Teaching Assistant, $15,000). Suppose 6 = [Database 
Systems, Associate Professor, [61k, 120k]], then y = {Data Mining, Data Warehousing, Query 
Processing, Associate Professor, $78,000, $90,000, $91,000, $95,000, $100,000). Since 1yfh-l = 1 < u 
(or T y),  SSI (y, T) returns 1, and we can conclude that t cannot be anonymized (or generalized) 
to 6. Using the same analysis, we can verify that t cannot be anonymized to any record in Tw. On 
the other hand, if t = [Distributed System, Research Assistant, $17,0001, t can be anonymized to 
6 = [Operating Systems, Research Assistant, [Ilk, 30k]]. 
5.1 Proof of Correctness 
Proposition 5.1 Referring to Protocol 5.1, given T (generated from t) and y = GetSpec(G), if 
SSI(y ,  T) = u (T C y), t [A1, . . . , A,] can be generalized to 6. 
Proof. We prove this claim via a contrapositive argument. Assume SSI(y ,  T) = u and t[Al, . . . , A,] 
cannot be generalized to 6, then 37-i E T such that ~i cannot be generalized to any value in 
{SIA1], . . . , 6[Au]) because rl, . . . , I?, are disjoint. On the other hand, since SSI (y, T) = u implies 
T C y, ~i must match some value yj  E y. Based on the definition of GetSpec(G), we know that every 
value in y can be generalized to some value in {6[A1], . . . , 6[Au]). Therefore, it must be the case 
that ~i can be generalized to some value in {&[A1], . . . , 6[Au]). This contradicts the assumption. In 
addition, since we assume r l , .  . . , I?, are disjoint, for any two ~ i ,  ~j E T, they cannot be generalized 
to the same value in {6[A1], . . . , 6[Au]). This guarantees that for 1 5 i 5 u, t[Ai] (or ~ i )  can be 
generalized to  6 [Ai] as long as SSI (y, T) = u holds. 
6 Complexity Analysis 
We briefly discuss the complexity of our protocols in terms of the number of messages exchanged 
and their size, as well. It turns out that the number of messages exchanged during executions of 
Protocol 4.1 and Protocol 5.1 is bounded by a linear function of the number of witnesses of the 
anonymous database. Protocol 4.1 requires that Alice sends Bob the encrypted version of tuple 
6i. Bob encrypts it with his own private key and sends it back to Alice. Further, Bob sends Alice 
the encrypted version of tuple t. Then, Bob sends Alice the encrypted values contained in t ,  in 
order to let Alice compute the actual, encrypted version of anonymized tuple t. Finally, Alice and 
Bob exchange the encrypted version of tuple di for checking whether such tuple and the encrypted, 
anonymized version of t match. Assuming the worst-case scenario, this has to be executed w times. 
Thus, the number of messages is 6 . w. 
The complexity of Protocol 5.1 relies on the size of Tw (ITw() and the complexity of the SSI 
protocol. The number of calls to the SSI protocol is bounded by Tw. Protocol 5.1 is not secure in 
the context of Secure Multi-party Computation, but it provides sufficient privacy protection in our 
application. We have also developed a protocol which is secure under SMC and achieves the same 
functionality as Protocol 5.1 but it is not as efficient. The protocol requires a more sophisticated 
SSI to test the intersection size. Due to  space limitation, we do not to present it here. 
We implemented both Protocols 4.1 and 5.1 using mySQL 5.0 and C++ using the NTL libraries 
version 5.4 for the numerical computations. We tested our implementation on the Income database 
from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository [4]. The database has size equal to  50.7 MB 
and contains about 286k tuples. Such database has been anonymized using both suppression and 
generalization-based approaches, for values of parameter k equal to  2, 5, 10, 20 and 50. The 
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Figure 3: Execution times of Protocol 4.1 and Protocol 5.1, as the parameter k increases 
resulting anonymized databases have been imported into MySQL 5.0. We then tested several 
times the insertion of a tuple in such anonymized databases. All the experiments were run on 
an AMD Athlon 2.1GHz with 1 GB of physical memory running Linux Debian. We report the 
average execution times (expressed in milliseconds) of Protocol 4.1 and Protocol 5.1 in Figure 
3 and experimentally confirm the fact that the time spent by both protocols in testing whether 
the tuple can be safely inserted in the anonymized database decreases as the value of k increases. 
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the larger the k is, the smaller the witness set. Consequently, 
fewer protocol runs are needed to check whether the update can be made. Further, we report that 
the experiments confirm the fact that the execution times of of Protocols 4.1 and 5.1 grow as 
(dataset size)/k. That is, each protocol has to check the anonymized tuple to be inserted against 
every witness in the worst case, and the larger the parameter k is, the fewer the witnesses are. 
7 Conclusion / Future Work 
In this paper, we have presented protocols for privately checking whether a k-anonymous database 
retains its anonymity once a new tuple is being inserted to it. 
In order for a database system to effectively perform privacy preserving updates to a k- 
anonymous table, Protocols 4.1 and 5.1 are necessary but clearly not sufficient. As already men- 
tioned in Section 1, other important issues are to be addressed: (i) the definition of a mechanism 
for actually performing the update, once k-anonymity has been verified; (ii) the specification of the 
actions to take in case Protocols 4.1 or 5.1 yield a negative answer; (iii) how to initially populate an 
empty table. In the following, we sketch the solutions developed in order to address these questions 
and which comprise our overall methodology for the private database update. 
As a general approach, we separate the process of database k-anonymity checking and the 
actual update into two different phases. In the first phase, the database administrator (DBA), 
following Protocol 4.1 or Protocol 5.1, checks whether the updated database is still k-anonymous, 
without knowing the content of the user's tuple. In the second phase, the DBA actually updates 
the database based on the result of the anonymity check; we refer to this step as update execution. 
At each phase, the database system and the user communicate via an anonymous connection as 
mentioned in Section 1. Also, legitimate users are authenticated anonymously via the protocol 
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Concerning the actual execution of the database update, once the DBA - Alice, in Protocols 
4.1 and 5.1 - has verified that the user's tuple can be safely inserted to the database without 
compromising k-anonymity, the user (Bob) is required to send to the DBA the non-anonymous 
attributes' values to be stored in the k-anonymous database as well. Note that the deployment 
of an anonymity system ensures that the DBA cannot associate the sender of the tuple with the 
subject who made the corresponding insertion's request. 
Suppose that a tuple fails the tests of Protocols 4.1 and 5.1. Then, the DBA does not insert the 
tuple to the k-anonymous database, and waits until k - 1 other tuples fail the insertion. At this 
point, the DBA checks whether such set of tuples, referred to as pending tuple set, are k-anonymous. 
Such test can be performed on encrypted data by using the methods proposed by Zhong et al. [28]. 
In the affirmative case, then the DBA proceeds to insert the k-anonymous tuples to the database. 
In the negative case, the k-anonymization of the set of tuples failing the insertion is periodically 
checked, again by methods presented in [28]. Note that, many issues need to be addressed for the 
approach described above to be effective. For instance, where and who is responsible for keeping 
the pending tuple set; how to inform and communicate with data users in order to initiate the 
protocol. We will address these issues extensively in the future. 
In addition to the problem of falling insertion, there are other interesting and relevant issues 
that remain to be addressed: 
Devising private update techniques to database systems that supports notions of anonymity 
different than k-anonymity (see the discussion in [lo]); 
Dealing with the case of malicious parties by the introduction of an untrusted, non-colluding 
third party [lj.];  
Implementing a real-world anonymous database system; 
Improving the efficiency of protocols, in terms of number of messages exchanged and in terms 
of their sizes, as well. 
We believe that all these issues are very important and worthwhile to be pursuited in the future. 
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